

JUN 17 1952

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

17 June 1952

SUBJECT: NIE-61: Consequences of Communist Control over the Indian Subcontinent (Revised Draft of Section I)

I. POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES

1. The political and psychological consequences of Communist control over the Indian subcontinent would vary with the circumstances under which the Communists gained control, the extent to which the West had become committed to preventing a Communist accession to power in the subcontinent, and the nature of the Western reaction thereto.

25X1 version only: Because we do not believe that the subcontinent is likely to go Communist in the near future, we believe it would be misleading to estimate specific reactions in non-Communist countries under presently existing conditions.)

2. In general, however, regardless of the circumstances or timing, a Communist accession to power in the subcontinent would have a profound shock effect throughout the non-Communist world. Mainland Southeast Asia would become more vulnerable to Communist pressure and the entire

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

the
area might quickly come under Communist control. Elsewhere, ~~neutralist~~
and third force sentiment would be discredited with a resultant hardening
of the division between the Soviet Bloc and the West. Whether or not
Soviet influence in the UN would be increased would depend on the cir-
cumstances under which the Communists gained power in the subcontinent
and on the Western reaction. ~~In short, while~~
Communist control over the Indian subcontinent would undoubtedly have
profound and world-wide repercussions, it is impossible to estimate
these repercussions in detail since it is impossible to know the time
or the circumstances under which such control would be established, or
the conditions in the rest of the world at that time.)

25X1

- 2 -

SECRET